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Abstract
In an extended version of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s (1988)
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1 Introduction
One of the main concerns for antitrust authorities is the detection and the
subsequent elimination of anticompetitive practices adopted by firms to re-
strict the free play of competition in the market. Usually, there are three
main areas of intervention: (i) prohibiting agreements between firms that re-
strict free trading and competition; (ii) banning abusive behaviour by a firm
dominating a market, or anti-competitive practices that tend to lead to such
a dominant position; (iii) supervising the mergers and acquisitions of large
corporations, including some joint ventures. In this paper we focus on the
first element, which includes in particular the repression of collusive agree-
ments. In the United States, the Sherman Act, at Section 1, declares that
”every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract
or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine”. In the European Union, Article 81(1) of the Treaty states that all
activities ”which have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market” shall be prohibited. This pro-
vision covers a wide variety of behaviours, but the most obvious example of
illegal conduct infringing Article 81(1) is a cartel between competitors.
However, certain types of cooperation are considered to be positive, es-
pecially when they stimulate firms’ innovative activity by means of technol-
ogy transfers and R&D cooperation. Both the American and the European
antitrust regulations recognize such benefit and allow cooperative research.
Since the passage of the NCRA (National Cooperative Research Act) in
1984, research joint venture in the United States were treated very permis-
sively by the courts (Utton, 2003, Ch. 11). Article 81(3) of the EU Treaty
provides the authorization for agreements which promote technical and eco-
nomic progress.1
1The European Union is a major sponsor of research and development activities in
many socio-economic areas. The aim is to promote R&D Joint Ventures among member
states; this could reduce the excessive R&D costs. A successful collaboration is the Air-
bus commercial airline project, sponsored by France, Germany, UK and Spain, aimed at
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As a matter of fact, collaboration in the R&D sector may breed collusion
in the product market, thus restricting competition (see, e.g., Geroski, 1993).
The interplay between R&D promotion and antitrust enforcement is the most
challenging policy area in Article 81 and many efforts have been recently
carried out in this direction. Similarly, US law distinguishes between joint
R&D and joint commercialization decisions; the former is legal, while the
latter is illegal.
In the pathbreaking contributions of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988,
1990) with firms investing in process innovation which generates spillovers,
cooperative behaviour at the R&D level is welfare improving for relatively
high spillover effects. Absent cooperative R&D, when spillovers are signifi-
cant firms would tend to invest less resources in an activity which favours the
rival as well. These results have been generalized to a wide class of oligopoly
models by Suzumura (1992). Kamien et al. (1992) specify that R&D coop-
eration among firms (in particular R&D cartelization in their terminology)
avoids the duplication of R&D efforts. Moreover, there exist circumstances
where it is necessary to let firms share the burden of costly R&D efforts which
otherwise would not be borne. In a nutshell, the bottom line of this literature
is that the innovation process with high spillovers requires modification of
the antitrust policy, although in practise we observe no serious attempts to
restrict acceptable collaboration to those sectors of industry were spillovers
are likely to be greatest.
In this paper we provide an alternative explanation for the attractiveness
of joint R&D activity when spillovers are low, since it unlocks investments
which would otherwise be reined in by (repeated) competition. As a conse-
quence, an antitrust policy aiming at systematically preventing cooperation
at the R&D level for relatively low levels of the spillover effect could turn
out to be welfare-detrimental.
To make this point, we extend the classical d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) model of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers to allow firms to refrain
from investing in innovative activity. In particular, we add an additional
stage to the d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990) (AJ henceforth) game
where two firms decide whether to carry out an R&D effort or not, and
competing against Boeing.
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maintain that antitrust regulations, based on AJ welfare analysis, hinder
any R&D cartelization between firms when technological spillovers are small.
We focus on the investment stage: if both firms invest, the remainder of the
game develops along the same line as in AJ; otherwise, either no one invests
or one invests and the other does not. By looking for subgame-perfect Nash
equilibria, we find that the unique equilibrium remains the one identified by
AJ with both firms investing in R&D.
Nonetheless, we discover a parameter region in which the game is a pris-
oner’s dilemma, as firms would earn higher profits without investing. This
region is defined by the interplay between two crucial parameters, one mea-
suring the extent of technological spillover, the other the efficiency of the
R&D activity. When the R&D activity is relatively efficient and spillovers
are weak, investing in R&D entails a significant reduction in own marginal
production cost which does not help improving the rival’s productive perfor-
mance. Firms are therefore keen on devoting resources to process R&D; this
results into a huge increase in output which, eventually, lowers market price
up to a level which is detrimental for firms’ profits, as compared to the case
where both firms abstain from investing.
We show that, in this region, if firms interact over time by playing
the same game for an infinite number of periods (such as, for example, in
Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995), then the no-investment outcome can be sus-
tained as an equilibrium of the repeated game. We obtain this result by
adopting the optimal punishment approach (Abreu, 1986). Not surprisingly,
the absence of process innovation investments implies a welfare loss as com-
pared to the outcome of the one-shot game with both firms investing. In
view of this, and taking into account that any form of research joint venture
(either with full spillovers or not) is surely profit- and welfare-enhancing, the
main policy implication of our analysis is that a public agency in charge of
regulating R&D activities should promote the formation of RJVs whenever
the technological conditions of the industry being inspected are such that
firms may actually be refraining from carrying out any substantive R&D ef-
fort. Accordingly, the present model outlines joint investment as a remedy
to the lack of R&D efforts, in contrast with the acquired view whereby it has
been traditionally proposed as a means to mitigate effort duplication.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic extension
of the AJ model. Section 3 develops the analysis of the repeated game and
outlines the main policy suggestion. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The basic model we use is a slightly modified version of the well-known
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model of process R&D with spillovers.
This model is a cornerstone of the analysis of research and development under
oligopolistic competition, and we will sketch its structure only. Consider an
industry with two operating firms, labeled 1 and 2. They sell a homogeneous
good whose inverse demand function is
p = a− b(q1 + q2), (1)
where q1 (res. q2) is the quantity produced by firm 1 (res. 2). Firms’
technology is described by the following cost function:
Ci = (A− xi − βxj)qi, i = 1, 2, i 6= j (2)
The variables xi and xj are the R&D efforts exerted by firm i and j, A
represents the ex ante unitary cost of production and, as usual, β ∈ [0, 1]
captures the extent of R&D spillovers. We adopt the same assumptions as
AJ regarding the restriction on parameters a,A, b and β; additionally, we set
b = 1. The R&D technology displays decreasing returns to scale, and the
cost associated with a reduction of xi in the unitary cost A is γx
2
i . Profits
to firm i are:
pii = pqi − Ci − γx2i . (3)
AJ suppose a two-stage decision process in which agents first select their
R&D effort and then the output level. They analyze this structure under
three possible scenarios: in the first firms compete at both stages (we label
it case ”II”), in the second they collusively set the level of R&D effort, the
production decisions remaining non-cooperative (”CC” in our notation); in
the third case firms collude both at the R&D and production stages. We
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limit our attention to the first two cases, as the latter constitutes a clear
infringement of the antitrust legislation.2
Henriques (1990) identifies the parametric regions for which the analysis
proposed in AJ is stable in the sense of Seade (1980). Within our framework,
this implies that we need to impose that:
γ >
1
3
(2− β)(1− β) when β < 1/2;
γ >
1
9
(2− β)(1 + β) when β > 1/2.
Notice that once fulfilled these requirements, concavity of profits in R&D
investments obtains, so that second-order conditions are satisfied.
Following AJ’s analysis, process innovation investment in case II is given
by:
xIIi =
(a− A)(2− β)
9γ − (2− β)(1 + β) , (4)
and the relative profit
piIIi =
γ(a− A)2 [9γ − (2− β)2]
[9γ − (2− β)(1 + β)]2 . (5)
Similarly, investment in case CC is:
xCCi =
(a− A)(1 + β)
9γ − (1 + β)2 , (6)
and the profit
piCCi =
γ(a− A)2
9γ − (1 + β)2 . (7)
As for social welfare (which is defined, as usually as the sum of consumer
surplus and firms’ profits), in case II it writes
SW II =
2γ(a− A)2 [18γ − (2− β)2]
[9γ − (2− β)(1 + β)]2 ; (8)
2There are few exceptions, given that a cartel which improves the overall efficiency of
the colluding firms could be allowed. Art. 81(3) of the EU Treaty is in favor of agreements
which improve the production and distribution of the products. However, this is not the
focus of our investigation as it is not specifically related to the R&D activity.
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while in case CC:
SWCC =
2γ(a− A)2[18γ − (1 + β)2]
[9γ − (1 + β)2]2 (9)
and we know that SW II > SWCC for β < 1/2. The antitrust authority
would therefore tend to impede R&D cooperation when the sector under
consideration is characterized by low levels of spillover.
2.1 The basic extension
We first extend this basic framework to allow firms to abstain from process
innovation if they wish so. We consider the case where the extent of spillover
is sufficiently low to justify the fact that explicit collusion in the R&D activity
is forbidden by law. This amounts to saying that the fines imposed by the
antitrust authority in case firms are caught colluding at the R&D stage are
so high to make collusion unprofitable. Therefore, we retain the assumption
that firms behave non-cooperatively at both stages to verify whether they
decide to invest in process R&D. Three cases may emerge: (i) both firms
invest; (ii) both firms do not invest; (iii) one firm invests while the other
does not.
Case (i) has been analysed in the previous section, with optimal invest-
ment in R&D and profit respectively given by (6) and (7). As for the sec-
ond case, identified by the superscript ”00”, if firms do not perform any
R&D activity at the first stage then x001 = x
00
2 = 0, and the model col-
lapses on the classical Cournot duopoly with symmetric marginal costs.3 At
the symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium firms produce a quantity
q00i = (a− A)/3, i = 1, 2 and enjoy a profit:
pi00i = (a− A)2/9. (10)
Move now to case (iii) in which only one firm invests in R&D. Suppose
that firm 1 invests and 2 does not; according to our notation, we use the
3In the ensuing analysis, the first letter in the apex refers to firm 1’s action, the second
to firm 2’s one.
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superscript ”IO”.4 In this case the investment in R&D by firm 2 is xI02 = 0,
and that by firm 1 is
xI01 =
(a− A)(2− β)
9γ − (2− β)2 . (11)
Quantities are qI01 = 3γ(a− A)/ [9γ − (2− β)2] and qI02 = [3γ − (2− β)(1−
β)](a− A)/ [9γ − (2− β)2]; finally, profits write:5
piI01 =
γ(a− A)2
9γ − (2− β)2 , pi
I0
2 =
[3γ − (2− β)(1− β)]2(a− A)2
[9γ − (2− β)2]2 . (12)
Notice that, by symmetry, in the case where firm 2 invests while firm 1
does not, pi0I1 = pi
I0
2 and pi
I0
1 = pi
0I
2 .
Assume now that firms play, previously to the usual R&D investment-
output game, a preliminary stage in which they decide whether or not to un-
dertake any process innovation activity. If the firm decides to invest (choice
“I”), it will select the R&D level according to the relevant case in the pre-
vious analysis; if the firms does not (choice “0”), it simply sets its research
and development effort equal to zero. Invoking subgame perfection, one can
describe the preliminary stage as the game depicted in Figure 1, which we
call the investment decision game (IDG).
piI01 , pi
I0
2
pi001 , pi
00
2
piII1 , pi
II
2
pi0I1 , pi
0I
2
Firm 2
Firm 1
0
I
0 I
Figure 1: The investment decision game.
We can state the following:
4Clearly, by swapping the indexes one can describe the symmetric situation, indicated
as ”0I”.
5Henriques-Seade conditions for the baseline case in which firms invest positive amounts
in R&D (case II) are sufficient for ensuring a well-behaved problem in the asymmetric case.
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Lemma 1 (i) The IDG admits a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
given by (I,I). (ii) Let β ≤ 0.2: the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma for
γ ≤ (2 + 3β − β3) / (27β).
Proof. (i) Standard comparisons among profits show that piIIi > pi
0I
1 =
piI02 and pi
00
i < pi
I0
1 = pi
0I
2 . (ii) pi
00
i ≥ piIIi iff γ ≤ γ˜ = (2 + 3β − β3) / (27β);
such a condition satisfies stability when β ≤ 0.2.
At equilibrium, firms always invest in cost-reducing technology, even if
there exists a parameter region where they would gain a higher profit by
not investing at all. In particular, this happens when γ is relatively low
and β ≤ 0.2, hence when R&D activity is relatively efficient and it does not
give rise to an intense spillover effect. This seems counterintuitive at a first
sight, as firms’ investment effort apparently pays off in terms both of the
reduction in the own unitary cost of production and of the limited extent
of technological spillovers accruing to the rival. However, the above result
can be explained by the fact that the combination of the two favourable
effects pushes firms to invest too much. Indeed, in the parameter region
under study, a relatively small investment in R&D entails a huge reduction
in marginal production costs and therefore a significant increase in output
which, in turn, lowers market price. The overall effect is a fierce competition
which turns out to be detrimental for firms’ profits as compared to the case
where both firms abstain from investing.
In addition, notice that ∂γ˜/∂β < 0 for all β: the lower the rate at which
R&D spills to the rival, the higher the threshold value of γ below which
the game is a prisoner’s dilemma. Stated differently, the higher the rela-
tive cost-advantage acquired through R&D, the higher is the maximum unit
cost of R&D below which the equilibrium where both firms invest is Pareto-
dominated, from the firms’ standpoint, by the scenario where both firms do
not invest.
Figure 2 diagrammatically identifies the region (labeled P) in the space
(β, γ) where the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Finally, one can evaluate the welfare in the case where no firm invests:
SW 00 =
4
9
(a− A)2. (13)
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For future reference notice that, by comparing equations (8), (9) and (13),
the following inequalities hold in P:
SW II > SWCC > SW 00 (14)
In principle there should be no need for the antitrust authority to in-
tervene in favour of joint R&D promotion given that firms, when they play
non-cooperatively, set the investment level as in case II and in this case
social welfare reaches its highest level.
-
6
0 β
γ
.5 1.2
AA: γ =
(
2 + 3β − β2) /27β (pi00i = piIIi )
A
A
BB: γ = 13 (2− β)(1− β) (Stability for β < .5)B
B
CC: γ = (2− β)2/9 (Second Order Condition)
C
C
DD: γ = 19 (2− β)(1 + β) (Stability for β > .5)
D
D
P.667
.444
.222
Figure 2: The Prisoner’s Dilemma (region P).
3 The repeated game
In the previous section we added a preliminary stage to the standard Cournot
oligopoly game with process-innovating R&D a` la d’Aspremont-Jacquemin
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and unveiled a parameter region where the game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
From now on we limit our attention to such a region, i.e. in all the ensuing
analysis we impose (β, γ) ∈ P. In the one-shot version of the game the
existence of the Dilemma is immaterial as firms always play the investment
strategy. Furthermore, non-cooperative behavior at both stages leads to the
socially second best outcome (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988, 1990).
This last remark would furthermore support the antitrust policy prescription
to forbid collusive R&D agreements in region P .
The picture changes if one allows firms to interact over time. Imagine
firms repeat the IDG described in Figure 1 for an infinite number of periods
t = 0, . . . ,∞ and let δ ∈ (0, 1) be the discount factor common to both firms.
Assume that firms plan their moves following the ”optimal punishments”
theorem (Abreu, 1986). In the remainder, given the ex ante full symmetry
across firms, we will look for a symmetric subgame perfect solution of the
supergame, and we will drop the indices identifying firms i and j as long as
this does not generate confusion.
Firms start by not investing (x0 = 0) in the first period and stick to
this decision until one of the two detects a deviation. If a deviation from
the collusive path
(
xd (0)
)
is detected at period t, both firms switch to the
punishment action (defined as xp) in period t+1. In period t+2, if both firms
have played xp in the previous period, they revert to the collusive path again
(x0 = 0), otherwise (i.e., if at least one of them deviates from the optimal
punishment by playing the best reply against it, xd (xp)), they continue with
the punishment. Following Abreu (1986), we state the following conditions
guaranteeing that x0 and xp identify a subgame-perfect Nash Equilibrium of
the repeated IDG.6
pi(xd (0) , x0)− pi(x0, x0) ≤ δ[pi(x0, x0)− pi(xp, xp)], (15)
pi(xd (xp) , xp)− pi(xp, xp) ≤ δ[pi(x0, x0)− pi(xp, xp)], (16)
where per period profit of either firm is a function of both its own and its
rival’s instantaneous investment decisions. In particular, pi(x0, x0) = pi00 and
6Abreu’s ”optimal punishments” could be substituted for by Nash punishments in
the line of Friedman’s (1971) ”grim triggers strategies”. However, the stability of the
agreement (as measured by the threshold level for the discount factor) would be lower in
this case. Calculations are available upon request.
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pi(xd (0) , x0) = piI01 = pi
0I
2 , as in (10) and (12), respectively. Inequality (15)
identifies the condition that must be met for the stability of the collusive
path, while inequality (16) identifies the condition for the implementation of
the symmetric one-shot punishment to be incentive compatible.
On the basis of symmetry in the optimal punishments, one can easily find
that
pi(xp, xp) =
1
9
[a− A+ xp(1 + β)]2 − γ(xp)2, (17)
pi(xd (xp) , xp) =
γ[a− A− xp(1− 2β)]2
9γ − (2− β)2 . (18)
Conditions (15) and (16), reformulated as strict equalities, define a system
of two equations in two unknowns (xp and δ) whose solutions represent the
optimal punishment and the smallest value of the discount factor compatible
with the collusive outcome of the repeated IDG.
From (15), we have
δ ≥ pi(x
d (0) , x0)− pi00
pi00 − pi(xp, xp) , δ˜, (19)
whereby
δ˜ =
(a− A)(2− β)2
xp[9γ − (2− β)2] {xp[9γ − (1 + β)2]− 2(a− A)(1 + β)} , (20)
that can be plugged into (16), to be solved as a strict equality w.r.t. xp. This
yields two solutions, the first is xp− = 0, and the second:
xp+ =
2(a− A)(2− β)
9γ − (2− β)(1 + β) . (21)
Notice that xp− coincides with the collusive action and therefore cannot candi-
date as the optimal punishment. We select xp+ as the punishment investment
level (incidentally, stability conditions guarantee the positivity of such in-
vestment). By substituting xp+ into (20) one obtains the minimum level for
the discount factor compatible with the collusive outcome:
δ˜∗ =
(2− β)[9γ − (2− β)(1 + β)]2
36γ[9γ − (2− β)2](1− 2β) , (22)
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which is included in the interval [0, 1] if (β, γ) ∈ P. To complete the dis-
cussion of the optimal punishment investments (see the Appendix for the
details), we should note that firm’s profit during the punishment period,
pi(xp, xp), is non-positive in a relevant parameter range. The security-level
condition therefore requires that, in this interval, the discounted value of
payoff generated by the (continuation) game starting from the punishment
period is positive for firm i = 1, 2:
pi(xp, xp) + pi00
∞∑
t=1
δt ≥ 0. (23)
In the Appendix we prove that (23) holds. We can therefore state the fol-
lowing.
Proposition 1 Let the optimal punishment level be xp+ and let δ ≥ δ˜∗. At
the equilibrium of the repeated IDG with optimal punishments firms do not
carry out any R&D investment.
As a consequence, in the repeated version of the game, there exist a
discount factor above which firms stick to the collusive outcome and decide
to not invest in R&D. In the interval under consideration, where (β, γ) ∈ P,
this would imply a consistent reduction of social welfare as compared to the
non-cooperative one-shot behaviour, as it can be ascertained by comparing
SW II and SW 00 (see 14). In particular, firms prefer to soften competition
by reducing (indeed eliminating altogether) process innovation, thus limiting
the increase in output that a lower marginal cost would drive. The negative
impact on consumption is not compensated by the higher firms’ profits, so
that the overall welfare effect is negative. This can be summarized as follows.
Corollary 1 The industry-level investment in R&D at the equilibrium of the
repeated IDG is socially suboptimal.
In this situation a benevolent social planner faces a delicate issue: firms
stick to a collusive result without engaging in an explicit collusive behavior,
that is to say they do not set their investments as prescribed by (6). As
the collusive agreement is implicit, it becomes extremely difficult for the
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antitrust authority to prove the existence of such an agreement and therefore
to intervene and restore the non-collusive outcome. Indeed, it may well be
impossible to prove in court that firms do not invest at all because of a
collusive agreement. The reason is that, while we are accustomed to think
of cartels that increase prices or decrease outputs, in the present case the
outcome is observationally equivalent to a standard textbook exposition of
the basic Cournot duopoly model, where marginal cost is exogenously give, or
equivalently R&D is assumed away. Accordingly, it would be just impossible
to collect any evidence of a collusive supergame which, in fact, is not taking
place. In principle, the antitrust agency could imagine what is going on, but
she would have no practical instrument to corroborate her guess.
While usually we think of situations where a remedy to effort duplication
is needed, here the opposite issue arises, namely the absence of any R&D
effort whatsoever. Our aim, in the remainder, is to illustrate that an or-
ganizational design for R&D activities that has been considered so far as
a solution to excess investment can also be a solution to its absence. This
instrument cannot be an R&D cartel (the CC outcome envisaged above) as,
for low spillover levels, the regulator would prefer the II outcome, which
is precisely what firms avoid playing through the implicit collusion we have
just outlined. This perspective would be a paradoxical one, where the an-
titrust authority suspects that firms are colluding but is completely unable
to obtain any evidence that they do so, and the regulator invites firms to
collude on R&D being aware that this would be welfare-inferior to the fully
non-cooperative subgame perfect equilibrium leading to II.
With these considerations in mind, we propose the alternative routes
consisting of either one or the other form of RJV that have been widely
investigated in the existing literature: the first is a setup where firms carry
out independent R&D efforts, but the spillover is set equal to one; the second
is a setup where firms jointly invest in a single lab and split equally the related
cost.
In the first, we have Ci = (A−xi−xj)qi, i = 1, 2, i 6= j and firm i chooses
xi to maximise
pii (SL) =
(a− A+ xi + xj)
9
− γx2i , (24)
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where SL stands for separate labs. This yields:
xi (SL) =
a− A
9γ − 2; pii (SL) =
(a− A)2 (9γ − 1) γ
(9γ − 2)2 for i, j = 1, 2;
SW (SL) =
2 (a− A)2 (18γ − 1) γ
(9γ − 2)2 . (25)
In the second, Ci = (A − xi − xj)qi for i = 1, 2 i 6= j again, but x1 and x2
are chosen so as to jointly maximise
pi(JL) , pi1(JL) + pi2(JL) =
2
9
(a− A+ x1 + x2)2 − γ(x1 + x2)2, (26)
with JL standing for joint lab. In this case, the equilibrium investment,
profits and welfare are:
xi (JL) =
2 (a− A)
9γ − 4 ; pii (JL) =
(a− A)2 γ
9γ − 4 , for i = 1, 2;
SW (JL) =
4 (a− A)2 (9γ − 2) γ
(9γ − 4)2 . (27)
It is then a matter of straightforward calculations to check that the fol-
lowing holds:
Proposition 2 In the parameter region P where a prisoner’s dilemma arises,
pii (JL) > pii (SL) > pi
00
i
(
> piII
)
, and SW (SL) > SW (JL) >
(
SW II >
)
SW 00.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we departed from the classical d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) model of process R&D with spillovers by letting firms the option to
invest an amount of R&D equal to zero. By using a supergame constructed
on this extension, we have shown that a regulator should be aware of the
possibility that firms endogenously refrain from investing altogether. In par-
ticular, in parametric regions where an antitrust regulation based on AJ
analysis would prevent collusive R&D, it may be worth for firms to avoid a
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harsh competition in the product market by limiting (eliminating, indeed)
the step of technological improvement. This outcome turns out to be socially
suboptimal. In addition, since the absence of R&D investment by firms do
not derive from joint (instantaneous) profit maximization, it may prove dif-
ficult for an antitrust authority to sanction such a behavior, and to improve
the industry efficiency. To cope with this issue, we have proposed a simple
solution consisting in promoting R&D joint ventures as a means of achieving
technological progress in situations where firms’ incentives may indeed point
in the opposite direction.
APPENDIX
Let (β, γ) ∈ P. Firm i’s profit in the punishment period is
pi(xp+, x
p
+) =
(a− A)2[81γ2 − 54γ(2− β)(1− β) + (2− β)2](1 + β)2
9[9γ − (2− β)(1 + β)]2 . (28)
The above expression is positive for values of γ external to the interval
[
3β(β − 3) + 2[(3−√(β − 2)3(2β − 1)]
9
,
3β(β − 3) + 2[(3 +√(β − 2)3(2β − 1)]
9
]
(29)
The lower bound of the interval lies always below the threshold for γ which
insures stability. The upper bound, on the contrary, cuts the region where
the game is both stable and a dilemma. This implies that one should check
the security level of the game, that is to say, verify that the value of the
continuation game after a deviation
pi(xp, xp) + pi00
∞∑
t=1
δt =
=
324(a− A)2γ2(2β − 1)[3γ + (2− β)(β − 1)]2
[9γ − (2− β)(1− β)]2[81γ2(7β − 2)− 18γ(2− β2(5β − 1)− (β − 2)3(1 + β)2]
(30)
is positive.
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The numerator of (30) is negative in the relevant parametric region, so
we focus our attention on the denominator. The sign of the denominator of
(30) coincides with the sign of its second term, for the first is always positive.
Standard calculations show that this term is negative (so that 30 is positive)
for values of γ external to the interval
[
5β3 − 21β2 + 24β − 4 + 2√2β2 + 5β + 2
9(7β − 2) ,
5β3 − 21β2 + 24β − 4− 2√2β2 + 5β + 2
9(7β − 2) ].
(31)
It is easy to see that for β < 0.2 the lower bound of the interval is negative,
while the second is smaller than the threshold for stability. This implies that,
when the IDG game is stable, the value of (30) is positive.
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